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ABSTRACT
The special role of money in the hyperinflation process, and
particularly in the stabilization phase, has now been reconsidered in a best-
selling essay by Sargent. The message is that credible fiscal stabilization
is the sine qua non of stopping inflation. This is definitely not viewed as
being in conflict with the monetary hypothesis, but it does represent a shift
of emphasis. We draw attention to a third aspect of the hyperinflation
process, and the stablization, namely exchange rate and interest rate policy.
Even though a government may accomplish all the right measures in terms of
budget stablization or control of money creation, there remains the problem
of making these measures credible and hence being able to actually achieve
them. We argue that exchange rate and interest rate policy in the transition
have traditionally formed the vehicle for establishing that credibility by a
de facto stablization. We make that point by discussing the events of the
German hyperinflation. In that case the stablization was a much more
diffuse, accidental matter than a reading of the classics reveals with
exchange rate policy playing a key role. Immensely high interest rates in
the face of a sharply appreciating free market exchange rate wiped out
adverse speculation thus helping to establish stablization. The real
exchange rate sharply appreciated in the final stage and persisted at an
appreciated level well into the post—stabilization phase. It reflects the
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Hyperinflations are the laboratory of monetary economics. It is
said that under these extreme rates of depreciation all other
considerations that may in normal times obscure linkages between money
and prices emerge strongly and obviously, beyond discussion or
controversy. Stabilisation of inflation proceeds If and only when the
source of inflation, money creation, is brought under control. This is
the traditional view endorsed by Keynes (1923) and particularly
developed by Cagan (1956) in his classical essay on the German
hyperinflation. The special role of money in the hyperinflation
process, and particularly in the stabilisation phase, has now been
reconsidered in a best—selling essay by Sargent (1982). In Sargent's
work primary emphasis is placed on the budget stabilisation rather
than on money growth per se. Indeed, he draws attention, as other
authors had before, to the very large rates of monetary growth
following the actual stabilisation.
Sargent's message is that credible fiscal stabilisation is the
sine qua non of stopping inflation. This is definitely not viewed as
being in conflict with the monetary hypothesis, but it does represent
a shift of emphasis. The two views are not strictly Identical because
we can imagine a budget deficit financed by domestic or external debt
finance in one case or money creation arising from creation of credit2
to finance private spending. It is therefore useful to separate the
point of emphasis of the two hypotheses even though they overlap in
practice.
In this essay we draw attention to a third aspect of the
hyperinflation process, and the stabilisation, namely exchange rate
and interest rate policy. We argue that even though a government may
accomplish all the right measures in terms of budget stabilisation or
control of money creation, there remains still the problem of making
these measures credible and hence being able to actually achieve them.
Since policies are not in fact exogeneous the issue of credibility is
paramount. We argue that exchange rate and interest rate policy in the
transition have traditionally formed the vehicle for establishing that
credibility by a de facto stabilisation. We make that point by
discussing the events of the German hyperinflatlon. The discussion
also reveals that the stabilisation was a much more diffuse,
accidental matter than a reading of the classics reveals with exchange
rate policy playing a key role. Immensely high interest rates in the
face of a sharply appreciating free market exchange rate wiped out
adverse speculation thus helping to establish stabilisatlon.
The discussion also draws attention to the behavior of the real
exchange rate during stabilisation. The real exchange rate sharply
appreciated in the final stage and persisted at an appreciated level
well into the post—stabilisation phase. This may well have facilitated
the political economy of the stabilisatlon because of the implicit
rise in real wages. It reflects the reverse of the coin of real
depreciation in the capital flight phase.3
initial Conditions
in the immediate aftermath of World War I Central Europe
resembled Latin America of the past twenty years: political turmoil
mixed with economic inequality, precarious democracy and financial
instability. Although the German hyperinflation stands out, problems
of high inflation or even hyperinflation prevailed In many countries,
including Russia, Austria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In fact, it is
doubtful that there was any country at all that escaped altogether a
significant increase in prices during World War I. The main difference
is how various countries coped with the subsequent stabilisation
effort.
It is interesting to start our analysis well before the
hyperinflation got underway and compare Germany with other major
countries. Table 1 offers a comparison focussing on the price level
and the dollar exchange rate. The benchmark is the United States and
the comparison countries are France and the U.K.
The central point emerging from Table 1 Is the large war-time
price increase everywhere, including the U.S. In the war years prices
more than doubled in the U.S. and in the U.K. In Germany and France
the increases were much larger, more than 300 percent and nearly 400.
But In this respect Germany was not much different from France.4
Table 1 Comparative Price Levels and Exchange Rates
(Indices 1914 =1, annual average)
U.S. U.K. France Germany
P P e P e P e
1914 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1919 2.6 2.5 1.1 3.4 1.4 3.9 7.8
1920 2.6 3.1 1.4 4.92.8 14.1 13.5
1921 1.4 2.0 1.4 3.42.6 18.1 10.2
1922 1.3 1.6 1.3 3.12.4 323.3 101.8
Note: P denotes the Wholessale Price Index, e the index of the local
currency price of the U.S. dollar.
The large change, of course, occurs in 1921: The U.S. and the
U.K. experience a sharp deflation as prices decline nearly 50 percent,
in France prices fall less than 40 percent and in Germany they
increase by a factor of 23 or 2300 percent. The U.K. returned to gold
at the prewar par in 1925. France stabilized in 1926-28 wIth a large
depreciation and a much higher level of prices, seven times the 1914
level. Germany by contrast underwent a hyperinflatlon before prices
were stabilized in a new currency. Clearly one decisive point is 1921
when other countries moved to deflation while Germany went into
inflation.
Germany emerged from World War I with significant losses of
territory and with a burden of reparations to be determined by an
Allied Commission. The immediate post—war years were overshadowed by
expectations of the reparation payments and by domestic political
turmoil. There were revolutions and revolts ranging from Soviet













of the demilitarised professional army. It was said that $100 could
buy you a minor revolution. Uncertainty about the political and
economic future is reflected in the erratic behavior of the exchange
rate (Mark/$ U.S.) shown in Figure 1.
In the brief period from October 1919 (the Treaty of Versailles
had been concluded in June 1919) to March 1920 the price of the dollar
tripled. The depreciation was a reflection of the uncertainty in
Germany, but it fed back to prices and fuelled the turmoil.. The sharp
collapse in spring 1920 was one of the few points of potential return.
Several factors helped create a moment of stability. The Erzberger
fiscal measures strengthened the budget, the right—wing Kapp Putsch
had been suppressed, and many other countries perhaps did not look
that much better. But these improvements did not last, in part because
of a sharp deterioration in the external balance.
A definite deterioration in the inflation outlook occurs in late
spring 1921 and relates to reparations. The terms fixed by the
Reparations Commission required Germany to pay 2 milliard gold marks
(2 billion in U.S. terminology) a year, plus 26 percent of German
exports in addition to occupation expenses. The London Ultimatum of
May 1921 required a front end payment of 1 milliard gold marks by
August 1921 in foreign exchange, and a second slice of 500 million
gold mark by November 15th of that year. The 1.5 milliard payment
amounts to about half of' total tax revenue. Using 1925 data a payment
of 2 inilliard gold mark plus 26 percent of exports would amount to
about 6 percent of GNP.Figure 2
The Dollar Exchange Rate in 19236
Further complications of the political climate arose when the
League of Nations imposed the separation of Upper Silesia from
Germany. Germany's foreign policy in respect to reparations and other
peace terms was a "policy of fulfillment'. At least as a matter of
policy, If not in the full delivery, Germany sought to implement the
terms of the London ultimatum. While the 1921 payments were in fact
met in early 1922, Germany protested her inability to fulfill these
stiff terms and in June 1922 suspended all payments. The French and
Belgium troops in response occupied the Ruhr area. The occupation was
met by German "passive resistance", the financial costs of which
completely outstripped any chance of price stability.
The Hyperinflation
The prelude to the hyperinflation is the first part of 1923 when,
In the face of the Ruhr occupation, the government attempts to
stabilize the exchange rate. Figure 2 shows the official dollar
exchange rate. Following the collapse in January, at the time of the
occupation, the rate recovers and is stabilized between mid-February
and mid-April. Inflation that had run at 28 and 89 percent per month
In December and January, rises to 111 percent in February and in
March. After the stabilisatlon of the exchange rate, there Is actual
deflation of 17 percent and only 7 percent inflation in April. As soon
as the exchange rate support is abandoned, because of huge reserve
losses, the hyperinflation gets underway.7
Table 2 shows the dollar exchange rate (paper mark per goldmark
as well as the monthly rate of depreciation andof inflation for the
critical period in 1923. During the Ruhr occupation in Januaryand
February 1923. prices had doubled each month as didthe dollar rate.
But in March and April there was a brief reprieve with fallingprices
and currency appreciation. The episode is explained by significant
Reichsbank Intervention In the exchange market. By May inflationand
depreciation accelerate and for the rest of the year the German
economy disintegrates as inflation rates reach atthe peak nearly
30,000 percent per month, or just above 20 percent per day. At20
percent per day inflation, the price level doubles inless than four
days I
Table 2 The German HyperinflatiOn in 1923
(Percentage Change From Previous Month)
Wolesale Prices Exchange Rate







The stories of life in the most dramatic stages of hyperinflation
are well known. Keynes reports how people would order twobeers at a
time because the beer would grow warm and stale more slowly thanthe
price was rising. Taxis were preferred to streetcars because youpaid8
at the end of the trip. Other accounts include stories on how firms
made payments of workers by furniture van. Schacht (1927) reports that
the demand for notes was so immense that 133 printing firms produced
notes for the government on more than 1783 machines with 30 paper
factories working full time for the government needs.
In July the inflation rate was still 3.5 percent per day. In
August it rose to 6.5 percent per day, in September to 11.2 percent,
and finally to an average of 20.9 percent in November. In the final
stages of the inflation, prices and exchange rates became closely tied
because even weekly reports on the cost of living or wholesale prices
were far out of line with current developments. Quotations of the
exchange rate and thus of the gold mark became the central pillar for
calculating prices. The shift to gold mark or foreign exchange based
pricing led to a big upsurge in inflation via, the once and for all,
elimination of lags. Perhaps it is this shift to foreign exchange sed
pricing that Is the ultimate element in the shift toward
hyperinflation. Clearly, in September—November prices were changed
more than once a day, and ultimately all and any inertia disappeared
in a process that Pazos (l978,p.93) has described as follows:
"The reduction of intervals [for setting wages and
prices} to their shortest possible duration and the pegging
of wage adjustments——both upward and downward—-to the freely
fluctuating quotation of foreign currency give
hyperinflation a mechanism different from that of
intermediate inflation. The day to day adjustments of all
contracts puts an end to all connections between the value
of transactions in successive periods..."9
The StabilisatlOn
Elements of the stabilisatlon occurred even before the extreme
explosion got underway. Three pieces were particularly significant:
First, on the political front the Streseman government,formed in
August 1923, put an end to passive resistance in October.Second, an
"empowering law" was passed that allowed the government to pass
regulations and laws even suspending the constitution whereverthe
national economic interest so required. Third, as early as August1923
the government had issued a 500 million gold mark loan, in partin
small denominations. These bonds had started circulating and had come
to be accepted as hard currency even though they carried nobacking
other than the governments promise to redeem in gold. Where the
political improvement offered the prospect of budget improvementthe
acceptance of the gold mark bonds (for whichconvertibility in gold
was certainly not assured) had paved the way for a new monetary
instrument. In fact the gold mark loan bonds served as backingfor
gold mark liabilities issued by municipalities andother government
bodies.
Plans for stabilisation focussed on two alternatives: a Gold Bank
or a Roggen (Rye) Bank. In the end the idea of a RoggenBank won out,
although in a somewhat different form, as the Renten (mortgage)Bank.
The key institutional elements of the stabilisation were three:10
*Legislationin mid-October introduced the Renten Bank as a
semi-public body with capital represented by fictious claims on
industry and land. The assets of the bank were to be claims on the
government and credit to the private sector. The total loans were not
to exceed 2400 millIon Renten or gold mark, half to the government
half to private borrowers. Of the government part 300 million were to
be set aside to retire the government floating debt held by the
Reichsbank.
*Theliabilities of the Renten Bank were the Renten Mark. They
had a convertibility feature that linked them to the successful gold
mark loan: upon request 500 Renten Marks could be converted into a
bond having a nominal value of 500 gold marks, thus establishing the
1:1 link between the Renten Mark and the circulating gold mark loan
certificates. Because these certificates were accepted as hard
currency the convertibility linkage of the Renten Mark could readily
take advantage. But the Paper Mark remained legal tender, and the
Renten Mark had the only claim that it had to be accepted by
government bodies in payment.
*Thesame legislation instituted the rule that the Reichsbank
would no longer be entitled to discount government bills. Reichsbank
note issue had to be backed at least one-third by gold and the
remainder by commercial paper.
On November 15th the Rentenbank came into operation and issue of
the Renten Mark started. Prior to the actual issue the government had
already issued at the end of October a small denomination gold mark11
loan. The loan was issued to cope with the cash crisis, namely the
fact that the real money supply had declined to levels so low that the
payments mechanism had substantially collapsed. Queues at the
commercial banks and the Reichsbank trying to obtain paper money grew
longer and more and more of the demand for paper money went
unsatisfied. Depreciation and inflation wiped out the real value of
money much faster than the government, municipal authorities and
practically anyone could create paper money.
Within a month price and exchange rate stability had been
restored. Extra taxation and the sharply increased real value of tax
collection in January 1924 and beyond eliminated fiscal difficulties
as a source of inflationary deficit finance. But there remained a
different threat, namely Reichsbank commercial lending. During
December 1923 and in early 1924 credit expanded so rapidly that a risk
of renewed inflation and depreciation in March 1923 had to be checked
by a credit crunch.
One of' the striking features of the stabilisation that is often
emphasized is the comparative stability of prices and exchange rates
in the face of rapidly expanding money and credit. Between the date of
stabilisation, November 15th, and the end of the year Reichsbank
credit increased fourfold. Over the same period the quantity of
Reichsbank notes outstanding nearly doubled.
Why Did Stabilisation Succeeed ?
There is no single obvious explanation for the successful12
stablilsation of the German currency. The standard explanations are
five, involving in each case a combination of a gain in confidence
based on one or more of the following fundamental factors:
*monetarystabilisation via the discounting restraints imposed
on the Reichsbank and the Rentenbank.
*fiscalstabilisation
*exchangerate stabilisatlon
*politicalstabilisation through the end of passive resistance
and the appointment of an expert group of the Reparations Commission.
*thereduction in the real value of money.
The question of how stabilisation was achieved is not exactly the
same as that of why hyperinulation occurred in the first place. But
the latter question provides a good starting point. There are broadly
two schools of thought: One emphasizes the budget and money creation
as active sources of the hyperinflation. Adherents of this theory
would make exchange rate adjustments passively respond to the domestic
inflation developments along Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) lines. The
alternative theory is the balance of payments approach. This theory
claims that adverse balance of payments developments force exchange
depreciation which then deteriorates inflation and with that,
budgetary performance. In a setting of passive money, exchange rate
disturbances then cause inflation. Political disturbances fit in
either setting as the proximate sources of disruption. For the
monetary—fiscal approach they initiate deficit finance. For the
balance of payments approach reparation payments are the source of13
extraordinary foreign exchange demands which force depreciation of the
currency which then spreads to domestic inflation and a widening of
the budget deficit.
For either of these schools the consolidation of the political
events via an end of passive resistance and the improved prospect of
stabilisation loans was thus an important Ingredient. But beyond that
there are differences on what Is the essential element In gaining
stability.
Sargent (1982, p.83) attributes the stabilisation to the
institutional limit on monetisation of deficits and the resulting need
for fiscal correction. The limit on government credit from the
Rentenbank and the prohibition of discounting of government debt by
the Reichsbank combined to separate completely deficit finance and the
monetary system. He notes that the government was forced into budget
balance and thus the objective conditions for inflation were removed
"by a series of deliberate, permanent actions to raise taxes and
eliminate expenditures." He refers In particular to the cuts in
employment in the public sector.
The success of fiscal stabilisation is seen in the budget shown
in Table 3.
Table 3 The Budget
(Millions of Goidmark)
1922 1923* 1924 1925
Expenditure 3951 5278 7220 7444
Receipts 1508 588 7757 7334
Budget Deficit 2442 4690 —537 110
Receipts/GNP 10.4%
*To October 31. Fiscal year April-March.14
Figure 3 shows the value of tax receipts in gold marks. The
figure makes apparent the erosion of tax revenue in the hyperlnflation
and the very rapid recovery of real revenue once price stability
returns.
The monetary—fiscal view would certainly be reinforced by three
further facts. First, the change in personnel, when in December,
Schacht, a self—confessed gold standard man, becomes central banker
replacing Havenstein, who thought of the monetary problem as being
that printing could not proceed fast enough. Graham (1930) is quoted
by Yeager (1981, p.59) as writing of Havenstein's death "a demise
which cannot be thought of as other than opportune'.
An institutionasi feature worth recording is the extreme
difficulty of putting Rentenbank notes into circulation: a printers
strike was taking place at the very time the Renten mark was to be
issued. As a result the printing was delayed and the note issue
proceeded very slowly. Accordingly, at no time in the early
stabilisation did the Renten mark lose in scarcity.
Two further facts were the following: in November—December 1923
there was an outright credit crunch. The Reichsbank had ceased
discounting government paper, which had been the chief source of
credit expansion. The increase in circulation from the Rentenbank
issue and expansion of commercial credit by the Reichsbank were not
sufficient to keep up with the increase in real money demand. Interest
rates went sky high. Pfleiderer (1976, p.192) notes the following
interest rates on paper mark credits, following the stabilisatlon:15




The Reichsbarik maintained an interest rate of 90% per year (and daily
charges) until the end of January 1924. Since between November 20th
and the end of December prices were constant, or actually falling,
realized real interest rates were extremely high.
A further factor, as already discussed above, was' the effective
implementation of the monetisation restriction: The Reichsbank was
prohibited from discounting government paper. When the Finance
Minister turned in December to the Renten Bank, he could not secure
credit and had instead to raise emergency taxes, anticipate taxesand
issue gold mark bonds.
Cred1b1liy
The monetary-fiscal stabilisation is, of course, a central part
of the stabilisation and indeed the fundamental factor. But this does
not really answer the more basic question: How does a government that
plans to do all the right things and, indeed, puts them on paper
secure the credibility that then makes it possible to live with the
policies? It surely is not the case that there is an objective way of
doing things right which, when hit upon, always and invariably yields
instant public recognition and success. Observers of the time (as





Tax Receipts in Gold Mark
(Mill. G.M:)
1920 1921 1922 1923 1924
687
46016
They were sensitive to It because they had seen earlier attempts in
Germany and In other countries that started off right, but then fell
apart because they were not supported by stabilizing speculation. A
case in point might be the first Poincare stabilisatlon of 1924 which
evaporated while the second, in 1926, stuck. Where is the difference?
Students of the German stabilisation were keenly aware of the
issue. Bresciani—Turroni (1930) refers to the stabilisation as a
miraculous event" and notes (p.355):
"The stabilisation of the German exchange showed, as did
that of the Austrian crown, this characteristic: The
exchange was stabilized before there existed the conditions
(above all the equilibrium of the Reich Budget) which alone
could assure a lasting recovery of the situation."
Of course, one would argue today that the fact of stabilisation
is immaterial, what counts is the firm expectation. With the
expectation of reduced money creation and inflation, there is growth
in real money demand which will be split between the transitory blip
due to the Renten Mark issue and a fall in prices. But that, once
again begs the question of the certainty about the budget. Various
observers note that It was the very fact of the cessation of inflation
which provided the stabilisation of the budget via increased real
values of tax collection. This argument makes the termination of
inflation a precondition for fiscal stabilisation rather than the
other way round. That argument, however, is not completely right. The
fiscal stabilisation had, in fact, four elements:17
*the increasein the real tax collection that came from the end
of inflationary erosion of the tax yield caused by collection lags.
*theelimination of the real value of the longterm government
debt in the hands of the public via the hyperinflation.
*theelimination of part of the floating debt in the hands of
the Reichs Bank by the substitution of the (interest-free) Renten Mark
credit, and
*thecreation of new taxes and cuts in outlays.
The important part, in respect to timing, concerns the longterm
public debt. The service of the debt amounted at the end of the war to
more than half the budget outlays. By 1924 it was less than 3 percent.
To achieve that result there was a need for a sufficently large
cumulative increase in prices before the other three factors could
complement the real debt reduction to stabilize the budget. In this
sense the timing of the stabilisation is not altogether indeterminate.
This point is certainly reinforced by the fact that the reduction in
outlays associated with the end of passive resistance was a
precondition for financial stability.
A very interesting suggestion comes from the analysis of Keynes
(1923, p.46—48) and Bresciani—Turroni (1931). The argument is that the
rise in velocity, because of hyperinflation, ultimately reduces the
real value of cash balances to so negligible a level that two factors
are at work. First sort of external loan will be sufficent to
place the entire currency outstanding on a gold cover, making it
possible to implement convertibility. Second, the extreme rise in18
velocity is not sustainable (furniture vans delivering daily
payments). As Keynes (1923, p.47), writing before the actual
stabilisatlon, puts it:
"...aminimum is reached eventually from which the least
favorable circumstance will cause a sharp recovery. ..When
the old value of the currency has fallen to a very low
figure, it is easy for the government, if it has any
external resources at all, to give sufficient support to
prevent the exchange from falling further for the time
being. And since by that time the public will have carried
their attempts to economise the use of money to a pitch of
inconvenience which it is impracticable to continue, even a
moderate weakening in the degree of their distrust of the
future value of money will lead to some increasein their
use of it; with the result that the aggregate value of
note issue will tend to recover."
Comparison of a number of stabilisation programs highlights this
critical aspect of exchange rate stabilisation. It appears invariably
as the key step in a program. It is not sufficient by Itself——this is
shown by the February—March 1923 attempt to stabilize, but it is the
critical step that coordinates expectations, at least temporarily,
around a new trend of prices and thus gives a chance to fiscal
stabilisation via the revenue effects. It might be argued that
stabilizing private speculation, in the face of the right kind of
objective evidence, would perform the same function. It might well,
but it would be difficult to disagree that to entice private
speculators to perform the stabilisation might require even more
monetary—fiscal overkill than if the government itself takes the
steps.19
It is quite clear that the government was aware of the need to
establish a sound base of departure for the stabilisation. Schacht
(1927) makes a point that between November 14th, when the Renten Mark
was about to be issued, and November 20th the government devalued by
333 percent so as to raise the value of reserves relative to the
quantity of Reichsmark outstanding. With money issue practically
ceasing, at least for a while, this meant a huge contraction of the
money stock in terms of foreign exchange and also in terms of domestic
prices. The devaluation was also designed to move the official rate
more in line with the free market rate observed in the occupied
territories. The quotations for the official rate in Berlin and the
free Cologne rate are shown in Table 4. Figure 4 shows the same fact
using the Berlin and Amsterdam rates.
Table 4 Official and Cologne Exchange Rate
(Billion Marks/$U.S.)
Official Cologne
Nov. 12 .630 3.90
Nov. 13 .840 6.85
Nov. 14 1.26 5.80
Nov. 15 2.52 6.50
Nov. 20 4.20 11.70
Nov. 20 4.20 11.00
Nov. 30 4.20 7.80
Dec. 6 4.20 4.90
Dec. 10 4.20 4.20
Source Schacht( 1927)20
The exchange rate data make the point that the stabilisation was
not an immediate, obvious set of measures reflected instantlyin the
exchange rate in the free market. Even by November 30th,when prices
had stopped rising, the free market rate still exceeded very
significantly the official now fixed rate of 4.2 goldmark per $ U.S.
Only toward the middle of December, a full month afterstabilisation,
did the market accept the policy. And as early as February—March,
because of excessive commercial credit expansion of the Relchsbank, a
new depreciation of the free rate ensued.
The exchange market was perhaps slow in recognizing the viability
of the policies merely because they could prove themselves only over
time. The request of the Finance ministry for accommodation, in late
December 1923, really shows that there was at best a potential
stabilisation, with institutions that were there on paper and on
probation.
Quotations from the weekly report of the Economist's reporterin
Berlin read as follows:
November 27th, 1923:
"The currency question continues to be in a mixed
condition and it is very dangerous to predict how things
will develop". (p.968)
December 4, 1923:
"The finances continue to be in a hopeless condition
and as the provisional Renten mark currency reform, which is
at best doubtful, cannot possibly succeed without budget
balancing the general situation is gloomy."
December 16th, 1923:
"The currency condition has distinctly improved, owing
to the price—fall now followed by a relative stability which
creates the impression in the public mind that the RentenFigure 4




















mark, gold loan currency and even the paper mark are, for
some reason not known to the science of currency, really
stable. This view cannot be held. The dominating influence
is that for the moment the same views seem to be held abroad
(as far as there is any dealing in German currency) and that
so long as foreign Bourses do not depress the mark, causing
a paper mark price-rise ...thestability will be
maintained.'
In that perspective a major credit for de facto stabilisation
must go to the actual fixing of the official exchange rate combined
with super tight credit. An interest rate of 3% per day, as prevailed
In November—December, after the stabilisation, amounts to a monthly
cost of credit of nearly 150 percent. In the face of an official
exchange rate that remained fixed the mere postponement of a
resumption of hyperinflation and hyperdepreciation by a few days meant
dramatic capital losses for foreign exchange speculators. The fact of
a depreciation of the dollar by nearly 100 percent, combined with the
huge cost of credit, operated as a dramatic stabilising device. It
brought gold into the central bank, thus further supporting the
ability to hold the rate, for the time being. In this view
stabilisation was de facto, just as it had happened in February—March.
Except that this time, in February-March, when the depreciation got
underway once more, another credit crunch immediately put off thoughts
of nearterm depreciation and thus sustained stability.
The fact that stabilisation was not an obvious, ready event is
best appreciated from day to day interest rate data immediately


























































that a return to hyperinflatiOn was not at allexcluded. Table 5 shows
data on day-to-day money on the Berlin Bourse.The rates are interest
rates per day. On the day the Renten mark cameto be issued interest
rates sharply increased from 5-7% per day to upwardof 20% and even
ten days later they still were above 5 or 6% per dayat least. Only in
the first week of December did rates fall to the rangeof 1.5-2% per
day. It is worth noting, of course that in themeantime, as is
apparent from Figure 4, the Mark was strongly appreciatingthus
causing immense capital losses for anyone speculatingin goods or free
foreign exchange. Schacht (1927) points to these capitallosses as
essential to establishing an effective stabilisation.
A fact that has received no attention is that this regimeof
extremely high real interest rates carried throughfor more than half
a year. This is apparent from the dolilar exchangerate, the price
level and money market interest rates reported in Table6.
Table 6 Interest Rates, The Dollar and Prices in 1924
Interest Rate (% per Year) Dollar Prices
Day Money Month Money (Index Dec.= 100)
Jan. 87.6 28.3 99.6 92.9
Feb. 34.9 22.6 104.1 92.5
March 33.1 30.0 103.2 95.5
April 45.9 44.5 103.2 97.3
May 27.8 44.3 99.5 95.0
Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1925, p.276 and Boardof Governors.23
Note that the day—to—day money, for lack of a daily price index
is not indexed while Monthly loans are indexed. The large difference
between the rates In January 1924, a full month after the
stabilisation, reflects the ongoing possibility of a resumption of
depreciation and inflation. One might ask how, conceivably, interest
rates can be so high. Who would borrow and who would not lend? The
active margin in all likelihood is foreign exchange. Given earlier
experience with stabilisation, and especially in the period February
to April 1923, the public had every right to expect that from one day
to the next, because of political events, the exchange rate could
collapse and hyperinflation might resume. But even the indexed rate is
extremely high, in fact It Is Latin American. The difference here
reflects, in part, the fact that indexation is stated in terms of
prices and not the exchange rate. To the extent that a collapse would
start with the exchange rate the indexed rate should in fact also
reflect somewhat the risk of renewed depreciation.
Note, too, the credit squeeze in April as the Reichsbank fights a
tendency toward renewed inflation by a sharp tightening of credit.
With prices falling and the stabilisation established the nominal rate
now falls below the indexed rate. Table 6 thus suggests that only a
few month after the stabilisation, and after repeated denmonstration
of the new rules was the reform, In fact, established. In the meantime
of course, realized real interest rates had been very large thereby
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Note: All prices measured in goldmarkusingthe current official
exchange rate.
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The view that emerges in this rendition does recognize the
importance of institutions (no government discounting, fiscal
correction, printers' strike), but goes further to argue that these
measures must, in fact, be made sustainable by actual success. Huge
real interest rates and a stop to capital gains on the exchange market
are the way to bring hyperinflation to a screeching halt.
Exchange Rates and Inflation
The discussion of the German hyperinflation, and of other
inflation explosions, invariably brings up the question whether the
exchange rate depreciation is the 'source" of Inflation. The argument
Is Immediately rejected on the ground that without validating monetary
policy the depreciation could not be sustained. But that argument may
be too cheap once It is recognized that money creation is certainly
endogeneous via the budget, and that the budget may be affected by the
rate of inflation and by the real exchange rate.
Consider Figure 5 where we show at ten day intervals the prices of
domestic goods and of imports in gold mark, that is paper mark prices
translated into foreign exchange at the going official exchange rate.
A rise in the gold mark price of domestic goods thus represents a rise
in inflation relative to depreciation and conversely f or a decline in
the gold mark price. It is quite obvious from the figure that there
are huge shifts In the relative rates. During periods of exchange rate
stability, in early 1923 and In late 1923 prices are stable or
declining. By contrast, following an exchange rate collapse as in25
April 1923, July 1923 and August 1923 there is anoutburst in
inflation. It is this sequence running from exchange rate collapseto
domestic inflation that motivates the balance of payments approach.
The justification relates to the budget. If a large partof tax
collection is not indexed, or if spending and taxes areindexed
respectively to the exchange rate and domestic prices,then exchange
rate depreciation opens up a budget gap that needs financingand
thereby validates the depreciation. The argument can simplybe made in
terms of a simple model of real money demand and inflationaryfinance
of the budget. Monetary equilibrium is described by the equalityof
real balances, m, and the demand for real money balances L:
(1) m =L(p)
where p is the rate of inflation. Deficit finance impliesthat the
growth rate of money be equal to the real governmentdeficit per
dollar real balances, or:
(2) gin =d(p) , d'>0
where g is the growth rate of nominal money and d is the real budget
deficit which is an increasing function of the rate of inflation
because of a lack of complete tax indexation.26
The model is completed by an inflation equation which states that
the rate of inflation is equal to the growth rate of nominal money
(which is d(p)/m)) plus an influence stemming from stock
disequilibrium in the Money market:
(3) pd(p)/w +a(m—L(p)), —d'Im -*a<0
Figure 6 shows the possibility of instability. The schedule BB
shows equation (3). The dynamics arise from the gradual adjustment of
real balances. An increase in the rate of depreciation eliminates tax
revenue and therefore calls for an increased inflation tax. But real
money demand adjusts to the higher inflation rate thereby erodingthe
inflation tax base and raising inflation still further.
The model can obviously be complicated to multiple equilibria.
More realistically one might want to recoggnize that there is the
possibility of adjustment in taxation to inflation. Specifically there
might be a longrun tax function which is inflation proof, but a
shortrun one which responds negatively to inflation. This extension is
worth considering because it responds to the obvious problem that a
shift to more rapid inflation, for a while at least takes the tax
system by surprise. It ties in with the exchange rate issue precisely
because exchange rate collapse would be the kind of surpise to the
fiscal authorities that causes them for a while to be catching up and
printing money.27
Given the instability of the model, fixing the exchange rate (and
the rate of depreciation consistent with stable inflation) is simply a
socially acceptable form of price control that arrests the inflation
process.
The exchange rate Issue enters the analysis in still anotherway.
One of the striking features of many stabilisations is the sustained
real appreciation. Figures 7 and 8 show the case of Austria and
Germany in the 1920s. The same is true for Poincar&s stabilisation in
1926-28. One explanation Is that the exchange rate is driven by the
portfolio holders decision to move out or into a currency. In the
phase of economic and political instability there is capital flight
which leads to real depreciation (and hence sharply accelerating
inflation). In the stabilisatjon phase, there are net capital Inflows
and stabilisation loans that allow current account balance or deficits
and hence a real appreciation. This fact is important because It helps
explain, in part, the success of stabilisation since It raises real
wages. But it also explains the immediately following
"stabilisierungskrise"—- the decline In activity that comes from the
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